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JUDGMENT AND NEGATION
Introduction
The first question one should ask when speaking about negativejudgments is: Are negative judgments possible at all? The second
question is: Is there a real distinction between negative and positive
judgments? Unless both questions can be answered in the affirmative, the
question, What is a negative judgment? is not a real question. The most
famous negative answer to the first question is that of Parmenides: he
denies the possibility of negative judgments. According to Parmenides.
we cannot say or know what is not. His thesis appears to be contradicted
not only by ordinary judgments, such as 'Theaetetus is not flying', but
also by the formulation of the thesis itself. How can we express it without
using any form of negation? There are several ways to solve this paradox:
either we say that on those occasions when we seem to pass a negative
judgment, we are in fact doing something else, that is, we reduce the
concept of negation to some other notion; or we take negation seriously,
that is, as an irreducible notion. If it is conceded that negative judgments
are possible, we have to answer the second question: Are we able to give a
criterion to distinguish negative from positive judgments?
In this paper I want to show that Chisholm has put forward some
important, either original or forgotten, theses concerning negative judg-
ments. Chisholm's theory of judgment, that is to a certain extent
influenced by Brentano's philosophy, gives a criterion to distinguish
negative from positive judgments and gives sense to such a distinction.
This is possible in so far as the fundamental notions in Chisholm's
theory, such as proposition and state of affairs, are defined by intentional
notions, such as a thinking or judging person.
In section 1, I distinguish several senses that might be given./o the
term 'negative judgment'. Because the term is ambiguous, the theses that
philosophers have defended concerning 'negative judgment' seem to be
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incompatible. The moment we see that they speak about different things,
we see that those theses are not necessarily incompatible.
i. DIFFERENT SENSES OF THE TERM 'NEGATIVE JUDGMENT'
Is there a way to make sense of the idea that there are no negative
judgments at all; that is, of the Parmenidean idea that we cannot say or
know what is not? This question should be dealt with together with
Parmenides' thesis that knowledge and being, or truth and being, are one.
Although there is a sense of 'truth' such that we have to concede that
there are both truths and falsehoods, there is also a notion of truth or
being which makes the distinction between true and false propositions
possible. This notion of truth cannot itself be a property of propositions;
therefore, it cannot be said to have a counterpart in there somehow being
nonbeing or that which is not. On this level there is neither falsehood nor
negation.
The notion of negative judgment has an important place in the
traditional theory of judgment. For example, in Locke's An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding (bk. 4, chap. 5) a mental proposition,
that is, a complete judgment, is conceived of as a joining or separating of
mental signs, that is, of ideas—a separating of ideas being a negative
judgment. This idea has a long history stretching back to the famous
passage in Aristotle's De Interpretatione, where a negation is defined as a
statement denying something of something (17a25). A central question
when we consider the notion of negative judgment is whether such a
notion makes sense in any other theory of judgment; if not, the question
whether the traditional theory of judgment still makes sense becomes
relevant.
An important distinction, which is not clearly present in this tradi-
tional theory of judgment, is that between a subjective act of judgment or
attitude of belief, on the one hand, and a judged content (Bolzano, Frege)
or judged object (Brentano), on the other hand. Given this distinction,
we are able to distinguish two different meanings of'negative judgment':
a judgment in which the judged content is negative, to be dealt with
below, and a negative judgmental act or negative belief-state. There is
another ambiguity in so far as a negative judgmental act and a negative
belief-state are not to be identified, as is argued by Reinach. According to
him, there are special states of negative conviction or disbelief. In
contrast to this, a negative judgmental act is nothing but the affirmation
of a negative content. Positive and negative judgmental acts do not differ
on the act-side (TNU, 134). According to Reinach, a negative conviction
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of something positive and a positive conviction of its contradictory are
different, not only from a psychological point of view in so far as the acts
are different, and from an ontological point of view in so far as the
objective contents differ, but also from an epistemological point of view
(TNU, 109 ff, 122-95). A negative conviction, for example 'This is not
yellow', has its ground in a so-called 'negative evidence', which is
dependent upon the being evident to us of a state of affairs, say, thai this
is red, which stands in conflict with the one that is disbelieved, that this is
yellow. Whereas a positive conviction can be got by 'reading off a state
of affairs, a negative conviction of a state of affairs presupposes some
other attitude, such as doubting or questioning, towards that state of
affairs. To summarize, Reinach rejects the distinction between positive
and negative in so far as momentaneous acts of judgment are concerned,
but he believes such a distinction to be relevant when we consider states
or attitudes.
In Brentano's theory of judgment there is not such a clear distinction
between states and acts as in Reinach's writings. I think that when
Brentano is speaking about judgments he mainly has judgmental acts in
mind. For Brentano, there are two types of such judgmental acts: to
accept (Anerkennen) and to reject (Verwerfen). To judge that God exists is
to accept God; to judge that God does not exist is to reject God. For
Brentano all basic judgments are of such existential forms. In the case of
more complex judgments like 'God is almighty', Brentano says that we
accept a complex object, the almighty God. Later, Brentano acknowl-
edges the existence of so-called double judgments. In a judgment like the
one just mentioned we first accept God, and then affirm of him that he is
almighty. Here a new type of judgment is acknowledged, that of
affirming something of something else (Zusprechen). This act of affirming
also has a negative counterpart, denying something of something
(Absprechen). In judging 'God does not know everything in advance' one
accepts God and denies of him having foreknowledge. Any affirming or
denying something of something is dependent upon an act of accepting:
we cannot affirm or deny something of something unless we have
acknowledged the existence of the latter.
Frege argues more vehemently against the traditional theory of
judgment than Brentano. He says that it is not useful to have a theory in
which there is a type of acts of denial besides one of acts of affirmation.
The judgment that there are centaurs and the judgment that there are no
centaurs have something in common. In both cases we hold something to
be true; in both cases we assert something. According to Frege, negation
finds its place not on the act-side. But he does not mean to say that
negation may find its place on the side of the object: what can be negated
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is the content judged to be true. The negation of what we judge to be true
in the judgment 'The square root of 2 is rational' can be expressed by the
clause 'that the square root of 2 is not rational'. What is judged to be
true, whether positive or negative, is a proposition (Gedanke), a notion
comparable to Bolzano's concept Satz an sich. A proposition is a kind of.
entity that is preeminently proper for negation. The primary function of
a proposition is its being judged to be true or false, presumably; it fulfills;
the role of being the bearer of truth and falsehood. Therefore, thcj.
negation of a proposition may be defined in terms of truth and falsity:«
the negation of a proposition is the proposition that is true when the»
negated proposition is false, and is false when the latter is true. •&
Frege has a strong argument against the thesis that there are negative!
acts of judgment. Take the inference 'If the accused has not been 'mt
Berlin at the time of the murder, then he has not been the murderer. The?
accused has not been in Berlin at the time of the murder. Therefore, he
has not been the murderer'. Suppose the thesis that there are negative
acts of judgment is true, then the second premise is the result of a
negative act of judging which has the proposition that the accused has
been in Berlin at the time of the murder as its content; in the first premise,
on the other hand, that the accused has not been in Berlin at the time of
the murder is not judged at all, which means that the negation must form
part of the content; this antecedent is a proposition which is clearly not
the same as the proposition which is denied in the second premise. This
means that the inference cannot be accounted for by the rule of modus
ponens. If the supposed thesis is true, we need an extra inference rule. In
all those cases where propositions are not asserted, for example when
they are members of disjunctions or implications, we need negation on
the side of the propositional content; if we also acknowledge the
existence of negative acts, this leads to unnecessary complications
(Verneinung, 153, 154). Another problem if we do not acknowledge
negation on the side of the propositional content is that we would need
to acknowledge not only negative acts of judgment but also negative acts
of asking, supposing, ordering, etc. Strictly speaking, these arguments
are not arguments against the acknowledgment of the existence of
negative acts of judgment, but arguments for the thesis that negation is at
least in some cases a part of the judged content.
From Frege's point of view, the term 'negative judgment' might be
said to mean a judgment with a negative proposition as its content. But
because such a negative proposition is defined only relatively to another
proposition, it is not decided yet that negative judgments form a
category of their own. That there is such a special category is denied by
Frege, for, he says, we cannot give any criterion to distinguish negative
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from positive judgments. In case we say with Brentano that there is a
special act of denial besides one of affirming, it is implied that the
distinction is not merely relative; this means that a criterion to distin-
guish them is needed.
A less obvious way to call a judgment 'negative' is to say that a
judgment is negative insofar as the way in which it is verified is different
from the way in which a positive judgment is. To generalize this point, we
might say that the contents of negative and positive judgments are made
true in different ways; that they have different 'truth-makers'.
2. CHISHOLM'S THEORY OF JUDGMENT
a. Chisholm 's Propositional Theory of Judgment
In his writings in the sixties and seventies Chisholm associates his theory
of judgment with the tradition that follows the prepositional theory of
Frege and Bolzano. Instead of using the term 'proposition' which we are
now used to giving as a translation of the terms Gedanke and Sat: an
sich, Chisholm uses, like C. I. Lewis, the term 'state of affairs'. Already in
1888 Stumpf used the term Sachverhalt to refer to the content of our
judgments, and in 1911 Reinach used Sachverhall for timeless and
objective judgmental contents with a propositional structure (for exam-
ple, that the rose is red), which he contrasts with something he calls a
Tatbestand (here: the red rose). For Chisholm, too, a state of affairs is an
abstract, timeless entity, which exists necessarily, whether or not it
obtains; it is in no way dependent upon any concrete, individual thing,
and it is such that, for example, 'The author of Waverly being knighted'
expresses a different state of affairs than 'The author of Marmion being
knighted' does, although each of the descriptions involved stand for the
same person. Chisholm has a reason not to use the Fregean terminology.
For Frege, propositions are primarily bearers of truth and falsity, and a
proposition does not change its truth-value. Chisholm, on the other
hand, says that states of affairs that now obtain may no longer obtain at
some time in the future. The judgment 'Some mammals live in the sea' is
no longer correct when whales have become extinct. Whereas Frege
would say that the judged content has changed, Chisholm says that the
content is still the same, but that its truth-value has changed as time went
on. Chisholm uses the term 'proposition' only for those states of affairs
which are not dependent on time for their obtaining or nonobtaining.
such as two and two being five. All other judgments have a state of affairs
that is not a proposition as their content.
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Because it is artificial to call states of affairs true or false, Chisholm
proposes other candidates for being the bearers of truth and falsity. He
conceives of judgments—not in the sense of judged contents—as the
primary bearers of t ruth and falsity (Replies, 205). He also says that such
judgments are "used with truth" (FP, 44). Here Chisholm probably does
not mean to say that the actual acts of judgment are the bearers of truth,
for then we have a truth-bearer only when someone actually judges; it is
better to conceive of the results of those acts as being the bearers of troth.
It is hard to imagine, though, that judging is something different from
holding something to be true (or false), which means that this something
is the bearer of truth and falsity; a judgment can only be said to be
correct or right. Chisholm might answer: Judging is accepting something,
or attributing a certain property to something. Applied to states of affairs
this gives the following analysis of my judgment that some whales are
white: I accept the state of affairs that some whales are white. Under this
analysis it is more natural to call the judgment true or false. I think,
though, that the notion of acceptance is ambiguous; we should ask: *
Accept as what? Accept as true, I think. But, then, it cannot be the act or
its result which is the bearer of truth. What the truth-bearer is in the case
of an attribution will be dealt with in the next subsection.
For Chisholm, the primary role of a state of affairs is that it may be %
conceived or accepted by someone (FP, 9). He defines a slate of affairs .'.
partly by this role. The second part of the definition of a state of affairs is
that whoever conceives it, necessarily conceives something which is
possibly such that it obtains. There being round squares is a state of
affairs, because there being squares is necessarily conceived if there being
round squares is conceived, and there being squares is possibly such that
it obtains.
A state of affairs p and a state of affairs q are identical if and only if
they entail each other. This means that p and q are necessarily such that
if the one obtains, then the other obtains, and whoever accepts the one
accepts the other (EPS, 30, 31). This identity criterion is very similar to
Frege's principle for individuating propositions: two sentences express
the same proposition if and only if it is not possible for anyone who
understands those sentences to judge the one to be true and the other to
be false.' Those sentences are standing in a relation of Aquipollenz. Frege
adds to this that these sentences should not contain any parts which are
immediately evident. Such a criterion cannot be used to determine that
two judgments have the same content; it can only be used in a negative
sense, to determine that two judgments have different contents. The
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criterion makes it possible to distinguish necessary truths, such as
mathematical t ruths , from one another. No calculation is allowed
between the two acts of judgment: the second must immediately follow
from the first. Chisholm uses the criterion to make sense of the intui t ion
tha t 'It is not the case that whales are not mammals ' and 'Whales are
mammals' express the same state of affairs. (Chisholm presupposes here
that negation has a classical meaning.) This example shows [hat there is
not a precise one-to-one correspondence between sentences and the
states of affairs they express.
On Chisholm's account, the predicates being true and obtaining do
not apply to different types of entities; for him. propositions are merely a
special case of states of affairs. Although Chisholm conceives of proposi-
tions as a subclass of states of affairs. I will often use the terms 'states of
affairs' and 'propositions' interchangeably, because his notion stale of
affairs has much resemblance with what is often called 'proposition'. A
state of affairs expressed by a certain declarative sentence obtains, or a
proposition is true, if and only if the object (which may be a set
consisting of objects) denoted by the subject term exemplifies the
property (which may also be a relation) expressed by the predicate (SP.
2$). It is clear that this definition only makes sense in the case of states of
affairs that may be expressed by atomic sentences. Further, states of
affairs are reducible to properties: we can replace that .\ is F by being
such that x is F. The obtaining of the state of affairs thai whales are
mammals can be conceived of as the exemplification by whatever
individual of the attribute being such that whales are mammals. In the
case of nonobtaining states of affairs no individual exemplifies the
property, say, being such that whales are fish. This leaves us with object,
property, and the relation of exemplification as primary concepts.
b. Chisholm's Nonpropositional Theory of Judgment
In his earlier theory of judgment Chisholm drew a distinction between
two types of judgment: those where a proposition is judged to be true,
called dedicto judgments, and de re judgments, which are attributions of
a property to an object (PO. J65fT.). And he argued that de re judgments
are reducible to de dicto judgments. At the end of the seventies,
Chisholm introduced a new type of judgment. At first sight the judg-
ments falling under this type seem to be a special case of de re
judgments, for a property is attributed to an object. But this object is a
special one: it is the judging person himself. According to Chisholm this
means that these judgments are different from de re judgments. What he
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has in mind can be explained by making a distinction between the
following two judgments. Suppose I am in a store and I see on a
television screen tha t someone is dropping her shawl, at which time I
judge: 'That woman is dropping her shawl'; the next moment I realize
that I am that woman and I judge 'I myself am dropping my shawl'. The
latter type of judgment Chisholm calls a direct attribution: an attribution
which we express by a 'he. h imself locution. 1 will call them first-person
judgments,
These judgments cannot be conceived of as normal de re judgments,
for in that case it would be possible for anyone else to make the same
judgment about me: ne i ther can they be considered as de dicto judg-
ments, because in that case I judge something about myself under a
certain conception. Chisholm does not believe in abstract I-
presentations ('Ich-Verstellungen' as Frege calls them) as parts of propo-
sitions or states of affairs. He agrees with Brentano that we never grasp
any individuating properties (FP, 16), that is, properties which belong
essentially to one individual (haecceitas). Neither do individuals them-
selves form part of propositions. Conceiving states of affairs as abstract
entities, Chisholm believes that they cannot be dependent upon a
concrete entity. It is true that the terms 'I', 'he', 'that', or any proper
name do not have meaning in the same way as, for example, 'the highest
mountain' has. but that does not imply that the meaning of these entities
is identical with the individual they stand for.
For Chisholm. sentences containing indexicals, demonstratives, or
proper names do not express states of affairs or propositions at all.
Judgments like 'Jones is brave' or 'That horse is a stallion' do not have a
proposition or state of affairs as their content. In a loose sense, we might
say that they are attributions of a property to an individual thing:
respectively, the man called 'Jones' and the horse pointed at. To be more
precise, for Chisholm, being a stallion is only the indirect content of such
an attribution, and the horse pointed at is only the indirect object. The
ultimate or direct object of all attributions is the judger himself. The way
we refer to ourselves is essentially different from the way we refer to
others. To myself I refer directly; there is no doubt that the reference to
myself succeeds when I judge that I feel pain. The knower and the object
about which we know something are in this case identical. To someone
or something else I can refer only indirectly, namely by attributing a
property to myself which implies an identifying relation by which I am
able to single out the horse from all other objects around me, and which
implies that the object singled out is a stallion. Being a description, it
may fail to pick up the right object, or it may pick up no object at all. By
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at t r ibut ing something directly. 1 attr ibute something indirectly (FP.
chap. 4).
This conception is comparable to what Brentano says: we apprehend
or accept something in obliqua by apprehending or accepting something
in recto (PES. 3: 37ff.). What we accept in recto, we accept as existing:
this is not the case when we accept something in obliqua. Brentano says
that when I judge that someone believes in the devil, then I accept the
one who believes in the devil in modo recto: the devil I accept in modo
obliqua. Or. when I experience something and accept what I experience,
then there is an acceptance of myself as experiencing in modo recto, and
what I experience I accept in modo obliqua. Brentano believes that all
and only psychical phenomena are experienced in inner consciousness
with immediate evidence (PES, 1: 128). Or. as Chisholm says, in every
judgment we have direct access to ourselves as judging persons. There is
a certain k ind of reflexivity which characterizes all mental acts.
Not only all at tr ibutions, but also all de dicto judgments can be
reduced to first-person judgments. The indirect object in the case of a de
dicto judgment is the proposition judged: the indirect content is the
property being true. The judgment 'All men are mortal' is a direct
attribution whose content entails an identifying relation by which I
single out the proposition that a/I men are mortal, and which entails that
this proposition is true. Here being true is conceived of as a predicate
among others.
Chisholm's attributional theory is not confirmed by our intuit ions.
When I judge 'Whales are mammals', my judgment is not about myself.
There are other problems with this theory. Suppose that when I judge
that elms are trees, I attribute to myself a certain property; if you then
judge that elms are not trees, you attribute to yourself another property.
These judgments do not contradict each other, of course. How then can
it be accounted for that you were contradicting what I was saying? A
possible answer is that the propositions entailed by the attributions
contradict each other. This can be defended for de dicto judgments. But
it leaves us with the problem how it can be accounted for that 'The
British Library has a copy of Das Kapilaf and 'It is not the case that the
British Library has a copy of Das KapitaC contradict each other, for
these judgments do not contain any propositions or states of affairs on
Chisholm's account. If one defends that (the results of) attributions
contradict each other, we have to assume that there is a Being who judges
everything—both what is true and what is false: this is probably not
what Chisholm wants to defend, if it is defensible at all. for even God
cannot judge contradictory things.
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A second problem is how hypothetical and disjunctive judgments
may find a place when nothing but attributions are admitted. Chisholm
would probably answer that the attributed contents are hypothetical or
disjunctive. A judgment of the form 'If the British Library has a copy of
Das Kapital, then there is still a Marxist in London' might be analyzed as
an attribution to the judger himself of the property being such thai
if. . . . then. . . . This analysis presupposes the concept of a proposition,
because the property must be analyzable into an antecedental and a
consequential part. Another way to analyze the judgment is to conceive
of it as an indirect attribution: to the British Library the content being
such that if having a copy of Das Kapital, then there is a Marxist in
London is attributed. Here having a copy of Das Kapital is a kind of
antecedental property: it is hard to explain, though, what this is without
introducing the notion of a truth-bearing entity like a proposition.
What is the form of 'the British Library has a copy of Das Kapitaf,
when it is not judged? And, has this form something in common with the
judgment 'The British Library has a copy of Dai Kapital This problem
shows itself in such an inference as: 'If the British Library has a copy of
Das Kapital, then there is still a Marxist in London. The British Library
has a copy of Das Kapital. Therefore, there is still a Marxist in London.'
If we want the inference to be valid according to modus ponens, the
antecedent of the first premise must have something in common with the
second premise (compare Frege's argument against negative acts of
judgment dealt with in the first section of this paper). But what can this
common thing be if the first premise is an attribution whereas in the
antecedent nothing is attributed. If we take the answer as given above,
that the common part shows itself in the antecedental part of the
attributed content, being such that if having a copy of Das Kapital, it is
properties as exemplified by a certain individual, or individuals as
exemplifying a certain property, that stand in logical relations. These
might also be said to be the common element in judging, asking whether
and supposing, say, I am in France. But what is an individual as
exemplifying a property? It cannot be meant in any actual sense, for
premises and conclusion may be false.
Further, the two judgments 'I am in Leiden' and 'Someone is in
Leiden' must have enough in common to explain that the latter, which
expresses a state of affairs, may be inferred from the former, which does
not express a state of affairs. We should not have a theory with two types
of entities fulf i l l ing the role of being truth-bearer. Indeed, for Chisholm
all judgments can be conceived of as attributions. 'Someone is in Leiden'
can be analyzed as: I attribute to myself the property being such that
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someone is in Leiden obtains. Now it becomes very diff icult to explain
what this attribution has in common wi th the a t t r ibu t ion to myself of
being in Leiden. It will be a severe complication if we have different
inference rules for concluding 'Someone is in Leiden' from 'I am in
Leiden' and for drawing the same conclusion from 'Peter is in Leiden'.:
A third problem concerns the analysis of (negative) existential,
singular judgments. Chisholm gives as an example an analysis of 'Tom
does not exist': "The properties 1 thought enabled me to single out one
thing and a thing that I called 'Tom' don't point to anything" (FP. 69). It
is not easy to use this analysis for the judgments '1 exist'. 'I do not exist'.
or 'I did not exist, then'. Do we have to say tha t in judging 'I exist'. I
attribute existence to myself; that is. that we have to treat e.\isience as a
first-order predicate? Or is 'I exist' not a judgment at all? Of course, these
judgments are not easy for any theory to analyze.
A last, important problem which any theory of attribution has to face
is a variant of the problem of the unity of the proposition. Every act of
attribution, in the sense in which it is a complete act of judgment,
consists of partial acts: the act in which the subject is posited, which is
the underlying act, and an act of attribution or denial of the predicate.
Even in the case in which the subject is himself the judger, an act must be
carried out by which the subject of attribution is posited. The awareness
of the subject which is an essential part of every intentional act. and
which forms therefore a unity with every such act, cannot fulf i l l t h i s role
because an underlying act is needed upon which the act of predication
depends. There can be an act of judgment only if there is a unity of the
two partial acts of subject-positing and attribution of the predicate:
further, this act of judgment has a content of its own, which has a unity
that makes it possible to be judged (compare Husserl [LU, vol. 5, §18]). I
believe that the partial act which posits something as subject, cannot but
posit it in a certain manner. In the case of '1. myself. . .'. it is me
presented by way of self-reference; this is something repeatable for it is
present in all my self-referring judgments. This means that it has a
general content, although not generalizable to other judging persons, and
that it may form part of a proposition.
The above-mentioned arguments are not so much arguments against
a theory of attribution, but rather against a theory which does not
acknowledge a proposition in all cases of judgment.
In the changeable world there are not only entities which have an
independent existence (ens per se), but also entities which depend for
their existence on something else, like this ball's being blue or this leafs
falling off a tree. The latter category of entities is called the category of
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states. States are not repeatable, although they might be said to recur
Yeltsin's being angry may have disappeared and be there again to-
morrow.
The primary role of a state is that of being a truth-maker. Further,
states are the entities which are related by causation. The judgment 'I
have a toothache' is made true by my state of having a toothache, but it is
also made true by my general state or by the state of the actual world.
This means that the notion of truth-maker needs some restriction. The
notion Chisholm uses is tightly connected to the attribution used by the
judger. We might call my having a toothache the minimal truth-maker of
'I have a toothache'. It seems to be artificial to say that 'Jones is brave',
which is an indirect attribution about Jones and a direct attribution
about the judging person, is made true by a certain state of the judging
person. For that would mean that a judgment ofthat form has as many
truth-makers as there are people who make the judgment, which is a
happy situation for judgments about oneself, but not for judgments
about other things. Therefore, it is more likely that the truth-maker is
determined by the indirect attribution, if there is any.
j. CHISHOLM'S THEORY OF NEGATION
a. Negation As Something Irreducible
The central question concerning any theory of negation is whether
negation is an irreducible concept. If it is, it may find its place on the side
of the act or attitude in our judgments, beliefs, questions, wishes, etc.; it
may form part of the content of our judgments; or it may find a place on
the level of truth-makers.
According to Plato, if we say 'Something is not great', we do not
assert something which simply is not, we assert that this particular in as
much as it partakes in the Form Other is other than those particulars
which partake in the Form Great. Other philosophers have defended the
thesis that a negative sentence such as 'this ball is not blue' really means
that this ball has a color which is incompatible with blue. The incompati-
bility is a logical one if it is assumed that any colored thing can have only
one color under the same circumstances. On this analysis it is presup-
posed that it makes sense to say that something is not blue only if it is a
colored thing. Therefore this type of negation is called the relative sense
of negation, relative to a certain genus or determinable (like color or
shape).
In a judgment like 'Happiness is not blue' we do not say that
JUDGMENT AND NEGATION 303
happiness has a color which is incompatible with being blue. Either we
have to say that there is no real judgment because 'Happiness is not blue'
makes no sense, or we have to take another meaning of negation into
account. Anyway, the relative sense of negation, and. thus, the incompat-
ib i l i ty analysis, is not enough to explain other types of negative judg-
ment, such as "God does not provide". 'John does not love Mary'.
'Unicorns do not exist', or the order "Do not close the window'. In these
cases we use a more radical meaning of negation, called the absolute
sense of negation. We cannot analyze such judgments with the notion
incompatibility because there is no generic property of which the denied
property is a specification. When we use these types of judgments, we do
not mean to assert that an individual has a property which is incompati-
ble with the one negated in the judgment. In the absolute sense of 'not',
things which are said to be 'not red' are said to be 'anything but red', so
that all things are either red or not red. whether colored or not. The
negation-sign in our inference rules has this absolute sense. We might
conclude that the incompatibility analysis captures only a part of the
meaning of negation. Besides, the relation of incompatibility or exclu-
sion can only help to explain what negation is. As a reduction of negation
to something else it fails, because it contains the concept of negation in
the deßniens: two propositions exclude each other if and only if they
cannot both be true.'
It seems natural to apply the incompatibility analysis in the case of
truth-makers. On this account, 'This ball is not blue' is true in vir tue of
the actual color of the ball. Here, too. we need to assume that there is a
relation of incompatibility or exclusion, namely between states. Two
states exclude each other, if an object cannot have both states but can
have neither. Again, we can ask: Which state could exclude that there are
unicorns, or that God provides?
Chisholm gives the following example to show that the incompati-
bility analysis of negation will not do: the judgment 'I do not believe that
it is raining in Graz' is not made true by a psychological state of mine
which is incompatible with that belief, for what state could fulfill this
role? According to Chisholm, we need both positive and negative truth-
makers: my state of not believing that it is raining in Graz is such a
negative truth-maker; it is a state with a negative content, not believing
that it is raining in Graz, and can thus be called a negative state.
Independent evidence for the existence of negative states is that they can
stand in causal relations: if John feels affection only for red-haired girls
(and only in so far as they are red-haired). Mary's not having red hair—
and not her positive state of having grey hair—causes John's not being
attracted to her. Further, we sometimes want to attribute something to a
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state, as when I judge 'Not being in love is a quiet state we sometimes
long for'. Negative states should not be confused with nonoccurring
states and events. For Chisholm. the latter simply do not exist. For
example, i f 'Th i s bal I is not red' is a correct judgment, the state 'the ball's
being nonred' is the truth-maker: there is not a nonoccurring state 'the
ball's being red'. Nonactualized possibilities form no part of Chisholm's
ontology. If a judgment is incorrect, the false-maker is simply the truth-
maker of the contradictory judgment.
b. \egative States of Affairs or Properties and the Relation of
Involvement
As is shown above, negative sentences often cannot be said to express a
positive proposition or state of affairs together with a relation of
exclusion: therefore, we have to acknowledge negative propositions or
states of affairs. As I already observed in the first section, according to
Frege. we do need a counterpart for'not' on the side of propositions, but
we have no means to distinguish negative from positive propositions:
being negative is only a relative property of propositions, namely,
relative to another proposition. Any theory which says it has a criterion
to distinguish negative from positive propositions should be able to
answer Frege's question: Which of the following sentences expresses a
positive, and which expresses a negative proposition: 'Christ is immor-
tal', 'Christ is mortal'. 'Christ does not live forever'. 'Christ does not live
in eternity'? (Verneinung, 150).
Chisholm says that it is possible to distinguish positive from negative
states of affairs. The first question to be asked here is: What is the
importance of a criterion by which we are able to draw the distinction?
In classical logic we need only a relative conception of negation. The
question therefore cannot be dealt with independently of another
question: To what extent can logic be conceived of as independent of
other areas where the distinction between positive and negative is not
merely relative? What I have in mind here is that the distinction has
some importance from an épistemological point of view, because posi-
tive judgments are not verified in the same way negative judgments are. I
will come back to this point in section 4. In Chisholm's writings the
importance of the criterion finds its reason in his philosophy of personal
realism, as he calls it. or to use another term, in his intentional ontology.
In denning the more basic notions of his philosophy such as property and
stale of affairs. Chisholm makes use of intentional notions such as
conceiving and attributing. In contrast with most analytic philosophers,
Chisholm does not use the notion of a sentence or of any other linguistic
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entity as an undefined term in those definitions. From an intent ional
point of view the distinction between positive and negative judgments or
thoughts is not merely relative. This means that a criterion can be given
if intentional notions are used.
Chisholm gives the following criterion to distinguish positive from
negative states of affairs: "a state of affairs is affirmative if and only if i t
does not involve its own negation: otherwise it is negative" (EPS. 37).
Two important notions are used here, that of involrmeiu and that of
being the negation of something. Chisholm presents his relation of
involvement as a counterpart to Bolzano's relation between a lorsie/lttng
an sich (an objective concept) and its parts. Bolzano says that the concept
a land that has no mountains has the concept mountains as a part, and
the concept the eye of a man has the concept man as its part: in contrast
to this the object 'land without mountains' has no mountain as a part,
and the object 'the eye of a certain man' does not have this man as a part
(H'L. §63). In the examples given the parts of a concept can be
determined linguistically; but is this always the case? Whereas the
concept racehorse contains the concept horse, the concept Sunday does
not contain the concept sun; we can only determine that the concept sun
is not a part of the concept Sunday if we know the meaning of'Sunday'.
(If this example still causes some doubts because of the etymology of
'Sunday', ask yourself whether arch forms a part of anarchist, or art of
article.) This means that the parts of a concept cannot be determined
linguistically. The way Twardowski. Brentano, and Stumpf conceived of
the notion being part of a concept was certainly not linguistic, for they
considered the concept color to be part of the concept red.
On the other hand, the notion involvement should not be taken in a
subjective, psychological sense. Such a subjective conception of being
part of a concept is to be found in Twardowski's work, as Husserl has
rightly pointed out (BT, 354, 355). Twardowski defends, with reference
to Bolzano, the thesis that we can use another term for 'the eye of a man'
in which the term 'man' does not appear. Then, he says, we immediately
see that the concept mo« is not a part of the concept the eye of a man. For
Twardowski, such a concept as man is only an auxiliary concept
(Hilfsvorstellung) for the concept the eye of a man (IGI'. 14). In contrast
to this, Twardowski says that the concept being extended is part of the
concept red. Twardowski uses the term \brsteltiingsinhall; in his words:
the Vorstellitngsinhall which is the meaning of the term 'red' cannot be
without the Vorslellungsinhalt which is the meaning of'extended' (Id'.
11). I think that the necessary relations between these two contents are of
a genetic-psychological kind; these relations are not internal relations
holding between the concepts red and extended themselves.
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Both Bolzano and Chisholm use intentional criteria to determine the
parts of a concept: that these intentional criteria are not psychological or
subjective has to be argued for. Bolzano says to this: all that has to be
thought necessarily in order to think of a certain concept, is a part ofthat
concept/ This means, he says, that the concept equality of all sides is part
of the concept equilateral triangle, but the concept eqiiiangitlarity is not
part of the latter. It may be the case that whenever we think of the
concept equilateral triangle, we think of the concept equality of all
angles, but here the relation concerns only the subjective thinking of
these concepts, it does not concern the concepts an sich ( WL, § 64. p.
83). Bolzano says he owes these ideas to Kant's distinction between
analytic and synthetic truths, and he refers to the definition of analytic
truths as those truths of which the predicate is contained as a part in the
concept of the subject (WL, § 65. anm. 7). Indeed, for Kant the judgment
'An equilateral triangle is equiangular' is a truth that is not analytic; as a
geometric judgment it is a synthetic a priori. A tautologous judgment
such as 'An equilateral triangle is equilateral', or to use Kant's example,
'Der Mensch ist Mensch', is not a typical example of an analytic truth
(Logik. § 37). More interesting cases of analytic truths contain the
predicate in the concept of the subject in a concealed or implicit way, as
in the judgment 'Bodies are extended'. It is clear that in such cases it
cannot be determined linguistically whether a concept is part of another
one: and neither is the relation between the concepts body and extended
a genetic-psychological one.
If someone introduces the notion being part of a concept or involve-
ment, we should ask whether he thinks that the concept extension is part
of the concept body: whether the concept color is part of the concept red;
and whether the concept equiangular is part of the concept equilateral
triangle. Chisholm does not give any explicit answer to these questions;
but his criteria to distinguish negative from positive states of affairs and
properties give some clues how he would answer these questions.
Chisholm introduces the relational concept involvement as follows:
"The state of affairs/) involves the state of affairs q = Df. pis necessarily
such that, whoever conceives it. conceives q" (FP, 124). According to the
criterion for negative states of affairs, 'It is false that balls are round'
expresses a negative state of affairs: its negation, that balls are round,
must be thought of when entertaining it. Does the state of affairs
expressed by 'It is not the case that it is not the case that balls are round'
involve the one expressed by 'it is not the case that balls are round'? As I
mentioned before, for Chisholm, there is not a one-to-one correspon-
dence between sentences and the states of affairs they express; further,
every state of affairs has only one negation. This means that the state of
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affairs expressed by "it is not the case that it is not the case that balls are
round', being the negation of that it is not the case that balls are round.
expresses the same state of affairs as 'balls are round'. A state of affairs
expressed by 'it is not the case that not p' does not involve the one
expressed by 'not p'; it is rather the other way round.
This is in accordance with Chisholm's ident i ty criterion for states of
affairs: whoever accepts that it is not the case that nol p. necessarily
accepts that p. This identi ty may be contrasted with the following
nonidentity: '(x) (x = x)' expresses a positive state of affairs, whereas
'-(Ex) -(x = x)' expresses a negative state of affairs, as conceiving the
latter implies conceiving (Ex) -(x = x). Although the two states of affairs
are logically equivalent, they are not identical.
Whether a certain state of affairs involves another one. can be seen
only when we express it in its proper form. Chisholm says that a sentence
mirrors the structure of a state of affairs provided that the principal
subordinate components of the sentence express the principal subordi-
nate components of the state of affairs (EPS. 30. 37); 'a state of affairs is
the principal subordinate component (p.s.c.) of another one' means that
the latter properly involves just what the former involves ('p properly
involves q' means that p involves q but q does not involve p). For
example, p is a p.s.c. of -p and of p & q. (It is not so clear, though, what
the p.s.c. of a certain sentence is: do we really have to entertain the
sentence 'There are dogs' in order to entertain the sentence 'There are no
dogs'? And why is 'no' not a p.s.c. of the latter sentence?) According to
Chisholm, each state of affairs can be expressed by a sentence which
shows the real structure ofthat state of affairs; expressed in a proper way
we can see whether the state of affairs concerned is a negative one. But
how do we know whether we have caught the proper form of a certain
state of affairs? For example, according to Chisholm, p is not a p.s.c. ofp
v q, because such a disjunction really has the form -(-p & -q), which
means that the p.s.c. is -p & -q. Chisholm gives no independent
argument, but he does not stand alone in this analysis; Brentano
classifies disjunctions as negations, too ( WE, 80). In accordance with his
idea to conceive conjunctions as positive and disjunctions as negative.
Chisholm gives another criterion to distinguish positive from negative
states of affairs: all and only affirmative states of affairs imply their
principal subordinate components.
Chisholm defines 'p is a negation of q' as either/) denies q. or q denies
P", 'p denies q, means that p contradicts q and p properly involves just
what q involves; and '/> contradicts q, means that p is necessarily such
that it obtains if and only if çdoes not obtain. Because a negation is used
in the last definiens. a reduction of negation is not intended. I wonder
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how the following problem can be solved: -[(2 -t- 2 = 5) & -(2 + 2 = 5)],
which is a logical truth, is (a denial, and therefore) a negation of [(2 + 2
= 5) & -(2 + 2 = 5)]. The latter is (a denial, and therefore) a negation of
-(2 + 2 = 5), because it contradicts and properly involves just what the
mathematical truth -(2 + 2 = 5) involves (I take these examples from
Chisholm [EPS, 35]). Because a state of affairs has only one negation,
-[(2 + 2 = 5) & -(2 + 2 = 5)] and -(2 + 2 = 5) really are the same state
of affairs. But this is not in accordance with the identity criterion for
states of affairs: someone who has no knowledge of arithmetic may judge
-[(2 + 2 = 5) & -(2 + 2 = 5)] to be true, because it is a logical truth, but
may not know the truth-value of -(2 + 2 = 5). When you are in doubt
about the latter point you may exchange 2 + 2 = 5 for a more complex
mathematical falsehood. If we hold on to the restriction Frege proposed
that the sentences concerned do not contain any immediately evident
parts, we can avoid this problem.
According to Chisholm, if the Fregean sentences, like 'Christ is
immortal' etc., should be read as 'Christ is such that (not). . .', they are
all affirmative. Because the sentence contains a proper name, it does not
express a state of affairs. Instead we can take as an example 'Someone is
such that (not) . . .'. According to Chisholm, sentences of the latter form
all express positive states of affairs; for him, such concepts as being
mortal and being immortal are both positive (see below). On the other
hand, if Frege's sentences are read as 'It is false that Christ (someone) is
(not) . . .', they are classified as negative (EPS, 33).
As I mentioned in section 2, in his later theory Chisholm says that
states of affairs are reducible to properties. This means that properties
form an essential part of Chisholm's later theory of judgments. Further,
it should be noted that for him all states of affairs have a negation, but
that not all properties have one (see subsection 3.c). The thesis that there
are negative attributes or negative universals has been argued against by
David Armstrong (Universals, chap. 14). One has to give a criterion to
distinguish negative properties from positive ones even if one rejects
negative properties; the arguments against negative universals given by
Armstrong make sense only when such a criterion can be given. Chis-
holm gives a criterion to distinguish negative properties comparable to
that for negative states of affairs: P is a negative property if and only if
there is a Q such that P contradicts Q, and P properly involves Q.
Besides, Chisholm gives two other criteria to distinguish negative from
positive properties. "Being-F is a negative attribute = Df. One cannot
conceive an attribute that excludes being-F without conceiving an
attribute that contradicts being-F" (OM, 154). 'Two attributes exclude
each other' means that it is impossible for anything to exemplify both;
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I and 'two attr ibutes contradict each other' means that it is necessary thai
I everything is either and that it is impossible that anything is both. It is
I clear from these definitions that we must already know what negation is.
I In case we can conceive an at t r ibute that excludes a certain a t t r ibute
J being-H without conceiving an at tr ibute that contradicts hi-iiig-H, we can
I conclude that being-H is positive. The remaining attributes can then be
I classified as negative. For example, being red is classified as positive, lor
I being blue excludes being red without contradicting it. This conception
I of a negative attr ibute presupposes that negative terms are applicable to
I things which fall under a genus different from that of the negated
j attribute. I f 'being nonred" meant 'being any color but red', the a t t r ibu te
I expressed would not be classified as negative—for we could then
I conceive an at t r ibute that excludes being nonred. say being a concept.
without conceiving an attribute that contradicts being nonred. The
attribute expressed by 'being nonred' is classified as positive, because we
can conceive an attribute that excludes it. namely being blue, wi thout
conceiving an attribute that contradicts it: the at t r ibute expressed bs
'being non-nonred' is identical with the one expressed by 'being red'.
What other attributes exclude being nonred'' Being crimson and being
scarlet do. Because being crimson does not contradict being nonred. it
seems as though the criterion says that being nonred is not negative. If we
want to save the criterion, we have to say that we cannot conceive
crimson or scarlet without conceiving red; for. if we want the criterion to
classify being nonred as negative, we have to say that we necessarily t h i n k
of red. when we think of crimson or scar/el. This. I th ink, is what
Chisholm would like to defend. Similarly, someone who thinks of horse.
necessarily thinks of animal. In general, all determinates involve their
determinables. and all species involve their genus. It follows that the
relation of involvement is not a purely linguistic or formal one.
Is being nonexiended a negative attribute according to the above-
mentioned criterion? An attribute which excludes it is being a body. If
Chisholm wants to defend the idea that being nonextended is a negative
attribute, he has to say that being a body contradicts being nonextended.
which means that the relation of contradiction is not a formal relation:
or he has to say that being a body involves an attribute which contradicts
being nonexiended. that is. that it involves being extended. The latter fits
in beautifully with the tradition. But the next example shows that it is a
rather arbitrary decision how strong we take the relation of involvement
to be.
What would Chisholm answer to the question whether the a t t r ibu te
being an equilateral triangle involves the attribute being equiangular'.'
Being not an equiangular triangle is not excluded by being equilateral, for
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any square exemplifies both properties. The attribute being not an
equiangular triangle can be classified as negative only if an attribute
which excludes it. say being an equilateral triangle, involves one that
contradicts it. Chisholm has to say either that being nol an equiangular
triangle and being an equilateral triangle contradict each other, or that
being an equilateral triangle involves being an equiangular triangle.
Probably he will choose the first alternative, although, as said above, this
implies that the relation of contradiction is not a purely formal relation.
Properties such as being immortal, being mortal, being straight, being
crooked are all classified as positive, because none of these pairs of
attributes forms contradictory attributes or involves them: nonliving
things are neither mortal nor immortal.
So far we can give a definitive answer as regards relations of
involvement only with respect to subdeterminates. like being red, and
thei r determinables. here being colored: these are the classical relations
of one-sided detachability ('einseitige dislinktione/le Abtrennbarkeit' [see
BOD]), as put forward by Brentano, and which he expresses sometimes
by saying that (seeing) color is a logica/part of (seeing) red (DP. 18-21).
An analysis of the criterion for negative properties implies that species
also involve their genus. This is also in accordance with Brentano in so
far as he believes that someone who judges that there is a horse,
immediately is able to judge that there is an animal.- In Chisholm's
terminology: the content of the latter judgment is entailed by the content
of the former. Dealing with the paradox of analysis Chisholm is perfectly
clear concerning the point that not all predicates which are in the
Kantian sense contained in the notion of the subject are involved by the
notion of the subject: for if that were the case, no analytic judgment
would be informative. The definiens of a cube, that it is a regular solid
with six equal square sides, is not thought of when we th ink of a cube
(SP. 34): according to Chisholm. the concept 7 is analyzed by the concept
8 - 1 . but neither involves the other. Because being extended is part of
the definition of being a body. Chisholm would probably say that the
latter does not involve the former. Certainly, being equiangular should
not be considered as being involved by being an equilateral triangle: the
judgment that all equilateral triangles are equiangular extends our
knowledge in the strong Kantian sense that it is a synthetic judgment.
The other criterion Chisholm gives is: a negative property does not
entail any property other than itself (OM. 147). "P entails Q = Df P is
necessarily such that, for every x and y, if y attributes P to x, then y
attr ibutes Q to x" (OM. 144) (see subsection 2.a). I wi l l not deal here
with the notion of de re modalitv: for Chisholm it is an undefined notion.
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Allrihiilion is for Chisholm an undefined notion, too: and he gives few
examples of necessary relations between différent attributions. A clear
relation of entailment is that between /> & q and />: probably there is not
such a relation between p and p \ q. because the entai lment of p v t/ by /i
seems to imply that p involves p v q. which is not the case. Thus, most
likely, being red entails being lolored. and can therefore be classified as
positive. Probably, heing nonretl does not entail being nomrimtitw.
Although being nonred implies being iwncrimson. it does not involve the
latter; 1 can perfectly well th ink of nonml without having the concept
noncrimson.
Do those, like myself, who th ink that Chisholm's criterion for
negative states of affairs and properties is sound, have to conclude tha t
Frege was wrong? 1 do not think so. What Frege meant is that no logical
or linguistic criterion can be given to distinguish between negative and
positive propositions. Chisholm's criterion is not a purely logical one: for
example, the relation of involvement between being red and being
colored cannot be accounted for in a purely formal way.
The criterion presupposes a hierarchy of concepts, not a type-
hierarchy, but a hierarchy as we may find in the Porphyrian tree. Such a
hierarchy cannot fit within an atomistic framework; but I do not think
that it brings with it any general philosophical problems. Further, the
criterion presupposes the important notion involvement. Using this
notion it is possible to give a more fine-grained identity criterion for
propositions; logically equivalent propositions need not be identical.
Further, the criterion presupposes a proper, essential form of a
proposition—or 'state of affairs' as Chisholm calls i t—but not in such a
way that there is a one-to-one correspondence between propositions and
sentences. The problem is: How do we know this essential form? The
intentional point of view alone cannot determine this; it gives no answer
to the question whether p v q really has the form —(—p & -q), rather
than the other way round. If we say that p v q must be negative because it
does not imply its principal subordinate components, we end in a circle,
for we have no independent arguments for considering negative proposi-
tions as not implying their principal subordinate components.
c. Attribution and Denial
The central question in this subsection is whether Chisholm acknowl-
edges the existence of judgmental negation, besides the existence of
propositional negation and property negation. The answer to this
question is only implicitly present in Chisholm's writings.
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As I noted before, whereas all states of affairs have negations, not all
properties have negations. Not all predicates express properties of their
own. An example—given by Chisholm — is the predicate in the sentence
"The word 'French' is inapplicable to itself: 'being inapplicable to itself
cannot express a property of its own. for the assumption that there is a
property hei/ii; inapplicable l<> /'/.«•// leads to paradoxical results—try to
appl\ it to itself. There is only the property being applicable to itself. On
which level is the negative part to be found here? There are two types of
judgment we have to take into account: those which have states of affairs
as thei r content, and those which a t t r ibute a property to an individual.
An example of the former type of judgment is 'Some words are
inapplicable to themselves'. Because the attribute has to be being
applicable to itself, a more proper form of this judgment is: 'It is false/ It
is not the case that some words are applicable to themselves'. 1 deal with
this type of judgment below.
If we take "the word 'French' " not as a name of an abstract, timeless
entity—as the word did not exist before Great Britain became
inhabi ted—the judgment "The word 'French' is inapplicable to itself is
an attribution. It cannot be the case that the property expressed by the
predicate 'being inapplicable to itself is affirmed of the word 'French',
for there is no such property. It must be the corresponding positive
property which is attributed, the property being applicable to itself.
Therefore the only way to analyze this judgment is by conceiving of
negation as a part of the act of judging. The property being applicable to
itsclf'te denied o(the word 'French'. Chisholm at one place explicitly says
that he acknowledges two types of attribution. Denying something of
something has the form '.v is not such that it is f": and affirming
something of something has the form: 'A is such that it is F (OPR, 324).
The similar i ty wi th Brentano's later theory of double judgments, which I
have mentioned in the first section, is striking (cf. also BTJ). Such a
theory of negation can be combined with the thesis that there are no
negative attributes, if it is able to answer the question what the denial of
a denial consists in. But contrary to that position. Chisholm admits
negative properties in most cases."
There is also some resemblance wi th the theory of judgment pro-
posed by Ducasse. Ducasse presents his theory of judgment as a
propositional one. denning a proposition as a particular entity, a pair
consisting of a certain physical place and an attribute. Such a type of
ent i ty Chisholm would not conceive of as a proposition or 'state of
affairs'. But Ducasse's theory of judgmental acts has much resemblance
wi th Chisholm's theorv of at tr ibution, for Ducasse savs that the assertion
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of a proposition is the assertion of one of the constituents, the a t t r ibu te ,
about the other constituent, a place, or any th ing indicated hy a name.
The latter constituent is ident i f iable u l t ima te ly by indicat ion. Fur the r ,
there are different ways of a t t r i b u t i n g : affirmatively, nega t ive ly . or in any
other 'mood', such as questioning^, optat ively. hypothetical!) (see his
FTK).
The idea that there are two types of judgmental acts cannot s imply be
extended to judgments wi th propositions or slates of affairs as thei r
content. In those cases Chisholm does not acknowledge a special
negative act of judgment. In contrast to the de dicto judgments Chisholm
has dealt wi th , which have the form 'p is true", such a judgment would
have the form 'p is false'. For Chisholm these types of judgment are really
attributions, with p as the indirect object and being true as the indirect
content. There is no essential extension of his theory if the form '/' i s
false' is added. The question is whether there is any difference between a
judgment of the form 'p is false' and one of the form '-/> is true' . Since
Chisholm says that the state of affairs expressed by 'it is false that /r
expresses the negation of the one expressed by '/»'. he seems not to make
any distinction. For him. the proper form of ~p is false' is: '-p is true'.
Here we might contrast Chisholm's position with that of Brentano
who explicitly defends the thesis that there are two types of judgmental
acts. Anerkennen and Vewtffen, Brentano says that the judgment 'A is" is
equivalent to 'it is false that A is not', but that the two judgments do not
stand in a relation of identity to each other. Such a relation holds
between two judgments only if they have the same matter and the same
form: that is. the object judged (das Beitrtei/tej must be the same, and so
must be the type of act (Lrl'. § 34). According to Brentano, the two
judgments 'A is false', or in existential form 'A does not exist', and '—A is
true' cannot be identified. 'A is false' is a direct judgment: it is a rejection
of a certain object. Only judgments of this type can be immediately
evident. For example. ! apodictically reject a square that is not a
rectangle when I judge 'All squares are rectangles'. The judgment '-A is
true' is an indirect judgment. Here we can judge only wi th mediate
evidence.
Brentano's theory does not imply that there is a one-to-one corre-
spondence between sentences and the judgments which they in t imate :
judgments which stand in a relation of identity may have different
linguistic forms. But there must be some kind of structural s imilari ty if
two judgments are related by identi ty, for in that case both matter and
form of the two judgmental acts must be the same. Here Brentano's
conception of identi ty for judgments deviates from the ident i ty-cr i ter ion
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proposed for propositions by Frege and Chisholm. Congruence cannot
be a criterion lor the ident i ty of propositions, as Frege says in a letter to
Husserl dated 30 October-1 November 1906. On the other hand.
Brentano's conception of structural similarity is not the same as Car-
nap's notion of insentional isomorptty. In the first place Brentano's
conception concerns judgments and not propositions. Further, in so far
as the matter of a judgment is concerned, it may be expressed in
nonisomorphic ways: for example. Brentano says that the parts of a
complex matter may exchange thei r places. The two expressions 'Some 5
are P' and 'Some Pare.V' intimate the same existential judgment (LrU, §
.14. section 95).
The question remains what the importance is of the distinction
between the judgments M is false' and '-.I is true'. Is the distinction
merely psychological, as Brentano sometimes suggests (LrU, 119)? Or is
it also ol importance from an epistemological and logical point of view?
It is clear that the answer to this question cannot be dealt with in
isolation. When we try to answer these questions the notion truth-maker
especially has to be dealt with.
4. A RECONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEMS
CONCERNING NEGATIVE JUDGMENTS
If we take a judgment such as 'God does not exist', we might say that
what makes the content of th i s judgment, the proposition that God does
not exist, true is the nonexistence of God. 'The nonexistence of God' is
an ambiguous phrase. Either it stands for a propositional entity, in which
case we have an in f in i t e regress in the explanation of what it is that
makes a proposition true: or it stands for a state or moment of a
nonactual object. The latter conception involves two problems: we
cannot consider 'being nonexistent' as a state or moment for that would
imply that (non)(\\'i.\tence is a first-order predicate: further, this concep-
tion presupposes that there are possible objects.
Chisholm rightly argues that we cannot take a positive state together
wi th a relation of incompatibility as the truth-maker for negative,
existential judgments. Similarly, the t ruth-maker for 'John does not love
Mary' cannot be one of John's positive states, for it is not necessary at all
that John's levé for another girl excludes his love for Mary.
Peter Simons ( in his LA) proposes as a truth-maker for the proposi-
tion that there are no unicorns, the actual world, the totality of facts. But
in that case we are no longer able to distinguish the truth-makers for
different negative existemials: ilial there are nu uniatrns and thai there
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are no mermaids have the same truth-maker. In the case of 'John does
not love Mary', he says, all the facts involving John's emotions make it
true that he does not love Mary. Again, this theory cannot distinguish
between the truth-maker for 'John does not love Mary' and that for 'John
does not love Sue'. On such an account there must be a good reason why
truth-makers for negative existentials are so different from truth-makers
for other propositions.
'The nonexistence of God' or 'there not being unicorns' can be taken
also in the sense of the nonexistence of a fact. Or. when we do not want
to be committed to an ontology of facts, we can say with the early
Brentano: the judgment 'There is no God' is true in virtue of there being
no God. For Brentano, the nonexistence of an object is nothing more
than a correlate of a correct rejection, just as the existence of an object is
a correlate of a correct acceptance. The later Brentano explicitly takes
the notion of correctness of a judgment as prior to that of existence of an
object judged and to that of truth of a judgment: truth belongs to the
judgment of someone who judges in the way someone would judge it,
who judges it as being evident. Someone's judgment is true if he asserts
what an evidently judging person would assert (WE, 139; LrU, § 42).
This conception of truth implies that I may judge correctly, even if that
judgment is not evident to me; but in order to be true, it must be
evidently judgeable by someone. Brentano takes this primary notion of
evidence not in any subjective or psychological sense.
Applied to the question whether there is a distinction between '-A is
true' and 'A is false', we can now say not only that they are distinguished
from a psychological point of view insofar as the acts are different, but
that their truth-makers differ, too. According to Brentano, 'A is false' is a
direct judgment. The rejection of A is a correct judgment if there exists
no A. Because, for Brentano, the truth of a judgment cannot be explained
by the nonexistence of the judged object, it is better to define this correct
rejection in terms of evidence: 'A is false' is correct if an evident judger
would reject A. '—A is true' is an indirect judgment; it is a judgment
about a judgment, or about a judging person. If someone judges '-A is
true', he thinks of someone who rejects A, and he declares that he,
insofar as he thinks of the so-judging person, thinks of a correctly judging
person. Such a judgment cannot be immediately evident, because the
judgment of someone else can never be evident to me; it can be
mediately evident, though. In Brentano's theory the notions truth and
truth-maker are not knowledge-transcendent. In general, his theory is
relevant to those theories that define truth in terms of provability. for
example the theory of Per Martin-Lof, where it is said that the judgment
'A is false' is correct if the proposition A cannot be verified (is
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improvable); and '—A is true' is correct if the proposition —A can be
verified (is provable).
When we concede, on the one hand, to Brentano that there is a special
act of judgmental negation, and. on the other hand, to Frege, that there is
prepositional negation, we acknowledge two forms of negation. Bren-
tano's position as regards negative judgmental acts implies that there is
an absolute distinction between positive and negative acts, and that we
have to find a criterion to distinguish negative from positive judgments.
Here we might use Chisholm's criterion. The advantage of using the
criterion here over using it for propositions is that the latter application
presupposes a proper form for each proposition. The criterion as used
for distinguishing negative from positive judgmental acts presupposes
some structure of judgments, but not more than that it consists in a
positive act and a content, or a negative act and a content.
If we acknowledge negative acts, why not say that there are hypotheti-
cal, conjunctive, and disjunctive acts, too? The problem is that in these
cases we do not merely need two propositions and an act which unifies
ther. in a certain way; what is judged must have a unity of its own, for
this unity is the truth-bearer. In contrast with this, the content of a
negative act is a proposition which already has a unity; this proposition
is said to be false. Further, positive and negative acts are acts of holding
true and acts of holding false. In contrast to this, we do not have a special
hypothetical truth-value or a disjunctive truth-value.
A theory which takes the notion of evidence or proof as a primary
notion, that is, primary to truth and existence, has to keep clear of the
company of relativists. This can be done only by introducing a notion of
correctness which accounts for the difference between real evidence and
apparent evidence, and between real proof and apparent proof. Without
such a notion we are not able to distinguish between true and false
propositions, and we cannot account for the fact that we may err. This
notion of correctness is what I have called the Parmenidean notion of
truth.
An interesting question is whether Chisholm has a comparable
notion in his philosophy. That is, a notion of truth or existence which
does not have a counterpart, that is, a notion of asymmetric truth.
Chisholm's notion of obtainmenl cannot fulfill this role. Both obtaining
and nonobtaining states of affairs exist in the same way. Is there a more
fundamental notion on Chisholm's account; that is, a notion which
makes the distinction between true and false propositions, or that
between obtaining and nonobtaining states of affairs, possible, and
which has no opposite? For Chisholm, exemplification is one of the most
fundamental notions. It has no opposite: a simple state of affairs obtains,
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if an object exemplifies a certain attribute. In the case of a nonobtaining
state of affairs, there is not a parallel situation, because there is no
relation of nonexemplification between the object and the attribute
concerned: there is just nothing. Therefore. I t h ink that ilw relation i>t
exemplification is meant to fulf i l l the role of Parmenidean t ru th in
Chisholm's writings.
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NOTES
1. Gottlob Frcge. 'Kurze Übersicht meiner logischen Lehre' (1906) (Ham-
burg: Nachgelassene Schriften, 1976), 213.
2. Chisholm's answer to the problem, which is not exactly the same as the
one I propose here, can be found in FP, 42-44.
3. According to Brentano, this holds also for the otherness analysis: "Die
Verschiedenheit erkennen heißt erkennen, daß von zweien eines nicht das andre
ist" (»E. 58).
4. "Denn meinem Sinne nach ist alles dasjenige, was man sich nothwendig
denken muß, um eine gewisse Vorstellung wirklich gedacht zu haben, auch ein
Bestandtheil derselben" ( WL, § 65, anm. 2).
5. "Aus dem Urteil 'es gibt ein Pferd' läßt sich also das Urteil 'es gibt ein
Tier' ohne jede Vermittlung folgern" (LrU. 209).
6. That is to say, in most of his writings. In the article 'Ein zurückhaltender
Realismus', Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 23 (1976):
190-97, Chisholm says that there are no Negativa at all in 'Plato's heaven'.
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